Required Textbook Readings to Accompany these Lecture Notes:
· The Elements of Moral Philosophy: Chapter 8 (sections 8.1 and 8.2 only), "The Debate Over Utilitarianism"
· "The Experience Machine" by Robert Nozick (in CourseDen)
· “The Singer Solution to World Poverty” by Peter Singer (via UWG Library website)
We will begin this module by considering a few more basic concepts:
· two different sorts of value that things can have: intrinsic and extrinsic;
· reasons why many Utilitarians now believe that the thing that it is well-being, not just happiness, that has intrinsic value.
Once we have covered those ideas, we will turn to the main idea of this module: what Utilitarianism has to say about world poverty.
In particular, we will consider the arguments of philosopher Peter Singer, according to whom Americans and other Westerners who have extra money have a strong obligation to use that money to help alleviate the suffering that results from poverty.
Philosophers typically distinguish two different kinds of value that a thing can have:
intrinsic value (df.): something has intrinsic value when it is valuable for its own sake rather than because it can help you attain something else of value.
The opposite is...
extrinsic value (df.): something has extrinsic value when it is valuable as a means to an end—in other words, as a way of helping you achieve something else that you value—rather than as an end or goal in itself.
This example illustrates the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic value:
Smith values his car, but he values it only because of the other valuable things it can help him attain. He can drive it to work and thus earn an income; he can drive it to the grocery store and thus buy groceries; he can drive it to the theater and thus watch movies. Smith values his car only because it can help him get these other things that he values. So for him, his car has only extrinsic value; it has no intrinsic value… it holds no value in itself.
On the other hand, Jones loves cars. She reads about them all the time, talks about them with other car enthusiasts, goes to car shows, and thinks about cars constantly. She saves her money to buy collectible automobiles that she never drives but keeps in a temperature-controlled warehouse. She doesn't value her cars because they help her gain something else of value—she values them for their own sake. For Jones, cars have intrinsic value.
It is possible for something to have both extrinsic and intrinsic value for someone. If Wilson loves her new sports car (enjoys driving it, reading about it, cleaning it, thinking about it) but also relies on it for transportation to get other things she values (food, money, education, etc.), then her car has both kinds of value for her.
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Here is what this has to do with Utilitarianism…
Generally speaking, Utilitarians say that the right thing to do is whatever has the best consequences for the most people.
But what makes a given consequence the best consequence?
To answer this question, Utilitarians need to specify one or more things that have intrinsic value, i.e., that are worth having for their own sake.
Then they can say: a morally right action is one that increases the overall amount of the things that have intrinsic value.
In the previous module we learned that, generally speaking, the word “utility” means usefulness. But Utilitarians use the word "utility" as a label for the things that they think have intrinsic value. And they explain what a morally right action is by saying that it is an action that increases the overall amount of utility. According to Utilitarianism, the moral status of an action will depend upon whether it increases the overall amount of that intrinsically valuable thing, i.e., on whether it increases the overall amount of utility.
According to many classical Utilitarians, that which has value for its own sake is happiness.
Utilitarianism was given its classical statement in the 19th century by two English philosophers:
· Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)
· John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the author of the book titled Utilitarianism
According to Mill's classical Utilitarianism, utility amounts to happiness, which he took to be the same thing as pleasure. Mill even called Utilitarianism "the Greatest Happiness Principle":
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism).
So John Stuart Mill accepted:
Hedonism (df.): pleasure and the absence of pain are the only things with intrinsic value. (The word “Hedonism” comes from the ancient Greek word for pleasure, hedone.)
To be happy or to have any sort of pleasure means to have a certain kind of experience.
But for the most part, modern Utilitarians no longer believe that experiences are the only things with intrinsic value.
In particular, they no longer think that pleasure and the absence of pain are the only things with intrinsic value. So they reject Hedonism.
Your reading has provided a number of illustrations why modern Utilitarians do not think that experiences, even very good ones, are the only things with intrinsic value:
· Robert Nozick's story about the experience machine supposed to illustrate the fact that humans do, and should, value things other than pleasurable experiences. He concludes: "We learn that something matters to us in addition to experience by imagining an experience machine and then realizing that we would not use it." [1]
OPTIONAL VIDEO: "Hedonism and the Experience Machine" (Wi-Phi) (4:06)
· James Rachels discusses some of the reasons for this in EMP ch.8 sec.2; see his examples of the concert pianist whose hands are injured and of the person whose friend makes fun of him behind his back. These examples are supposed to show that "[w]e value things other than pleasure. For example, we value artistic creativity and friendship. These things make us happy, but that's not the only reason we value them. It seems like a misfortune to lose them, even if there is no loss of happiness" (EMP p.120).
If Rachels and Nozick are right, then Utilitarianism is wrong if it assumes that the only thing with intrinsic value is a certain kind of experience… like happiness or pleasure.
For the most part, modern Utilitarians do not focus on any sort of experience.
Instead, some (but not all) modern Utilitarians focus on welfare or general well-being. This can include having pleasurable experiences, but it also includes more than that, for example: having genuine, healthy relationships with other people; having the opportunity to make genuine accomplishments; and being physically and mentally healthy.
Peter Singer (b. 1946) is a Utilitarian philosopher who teaches at Princeton University.[2]
Singer thinks, not just that it is a good thing for people to donate to famine relief, but that for most Americans and other people in the developed world, it is obligatory.
obligatory (df.): required by morality; if an action is obligatory, then if you don’t do it, then you’ve done something immoral.
· An example of an action that most people will think is obligatory: Suppose you are walking down the beach when you see a small child drowning in very shallow water. There is no one else around. In order to save the child's life, all that you have to do is wade out into the water and pick him up. Most people would view saving the child’s life as obligatory—morality requires you do it, and so if you don't do it, you have behaved immorally and deserve blame.
Here Singer disagrees with most Americans, who seem to think that donating money to famine relief is supererogatory.
supererogatory (df.): going beyond what morality requires in order to do something especially good; if an action is supererogatory, you are not obligated to do it, so failing to do it would not be immoral; but if you do it, you've done something morally good and deserve praise.
· An example of an action that most people will think is supererogatory: Suppose you are walking down the beach when you see, out in the water, someone who appears to be drowning. The person is several hundred yards from shore; the water is very choppy; so far as you are aware, the person is a stranger to you; and you have no training as life guard—in fact, you are not even a very good swimmer! But you decide to risk your life to swim out and attempt to save the drowning person's life. Many people would view this action as supererogatory—morality did not require that you do it, but you deserve moral praise for doing it. You went above and beyond what morality required of you.
Singer believes that if, after paying for all of your own basic expenses (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), you have money left over, you should donate that money to help alleviate the effects of poverty, especially to help stop people in developing countries from dying of starvation. He says that this is not supererogatory—you are obligated to donate your extra money to this sort of effort.
By doing so, you will decrease suffering in the world more than you would by spending your money on expensive cars, clothing, fancy meals, etc.
If Singer's Utilitarian Argument about World Poverty works, it is immoral for me to buy a movie ticket (or other item that I really don't need), when I could cause a greater increase in the amount of well-being in the world by doing something else with that money.
· E.g., UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund) estimates that around 4,920 children under the age of five die each day due to four easily preventable diseases: pneumonia, diarrhea (sometimes resulting from malnutrition), malaria and tuberculosis.[3] That amounts to about one child every 17 seconds.
· UNICEF also estimates that it costs $.50 per day (about $15 per month) to provide enough therapeutic food packets to keep one child alive.
OPTIONAL VIDEO: 60 Minutes interview with Peter Singer on world poverty (4:16; 1999)
[8.4.1.] The Central Station Argument.
[See the story about Dora, a character in the film Central Station: pp.60–61 of the Singer article.]
In the end, what is the ethical distinction between a Brazilian who sells a homeless child to organ peddlers and an American who already has a TV and upgrades to a better one—knowing that the money could be donated to an organization that would use it to save the lives of kids in need? (p.61)
Singer believes that there is no moral distinction between the two. Since selling a homeless child to an organ peddler in order to buy yourself a new TV is immoral, it is also immoral for a middle-class American to spend money on a new TV instead of giving that money to a charity that would use it to save the life of a child (or the lives of many children).
We can put Singer’s argument into standard form as follows:
1. Dora sold a homeless child to organ peddlers, which (i) she knew would lead to his death, (ii) in order to buy herself something that she didn’t really need.
2. Most Americans (and other relatively wealthy people) do not donate to charity, which (i) they know will lead to the deaths of impoverished children, (ii) in order to buy themselves things that they don’t really need.
3. What Dora did was (iii) immoral.
4. Therefore, what most Americans (and other relatively wealthy people) do is (iii) immoral.
This kind of argument is called an
argument by analogy (df.): an argument that begins by pointing out that two or more things have a number of traits in common and concludes that those things have some further trait in common.
Here is another, non-philosophical example of an argument by analogy:
1. The last two Spider-Man movies (i) starred Tom Holland and Zendaya, (ii) were produced by Kevin Feige and directed by John Watts, and (iii) was released by Marvel Studios and Sony Pictures.
2. The next Spider-Man movie (i) will star Tom Holland and Zendaya, (ii) will be produced by Kevin Feige and directed by John Watts, and (iii) will be released by Marvel Studios and Sony Pictures.
3. The last two Spider-Man movies were (iv) commercially successful.
4. Therefore, the next Spider-Man movie will be (iv) commercially successful.
This just puts into standard form a kind of reasoning that people engage in about all kinds of thing every day.
IMPORTANT: Arguments from analogy are never logically valid.
EQUALLY IMPORTANT: They are not intended to be logically valid! An argument from analogy can be logically strong without being valid:
logical strength (df.): an argument is logically strong when the truth of the premises would provide very good reason for thinking that the conclusion is true without guaranteeing that it is true.
The Avengers argument is definitely not logically valid. Even if all premises are true, it is possible that the conclusion is false: in spring 2019, it might have turned out that people had just gotten sick of superhero movies and decided not to pay to see Endgame, and if that had happened, it would have been a box office failure. Still, the premises of that argument do provide an excellent reason for thinking that the conclusion will be true, even if they don’t logically guarantee that it will be true.
So that fact that Singer’s argument lacks logical validity is not a bad thing. To assess the logic of this kind of argument, we don’t ask whether it’s valid; we ask how logically strong it is.
And as this suggests, unlike validity (which is all-or-nothing), logical strength is a matter of degree. The Avengers argument is extremely strong. Norcross’s puppy torture argument might not be as strong as that, but it could still be very strong.
To assess the Central Station Argument, we need to ask: (a) are its premises true, and (b) is it logically strong (would the truth of its premises give us good reason to accept its conclusion)?
[8.4.2.] An Objection and a Reply.
Singer considers the following objection to the Central Station argument:
It is a very different thing knowingly to give a child who you know and who is standing right in front of you over to organ peddlers in exchange for a new television, than to spend money on a new television rather than give that money to a charity, who would use that money to save the life of a child you don’t know and who you will never meet.
In other words, there is a relevant disanalogy between Dora and us: she is dealing with a child whom she knows and who is standing right in front of her. We are not.
Singer’s response to the objection:
If you are a Utilitarian like him, then there really is no moral difference, because the consequences are the same in each case: a child dies needlessly.
But Singer realizes that not everyone reading his article is a utilitarian, and he writes:
…one doesn’t need to embrace my utilitarian ethic to see that, at the very least, there is a troubling incongruity [i.e., inconsistency] in being so quick to condemn Dora for taking the child to the organ peddlers while, at the same time, not regarding the American consumer’s behavior as raising a serious moral issue. (p.61)
So Singer has another argument to offer in support of his utilitarian position, one that may be stronger than the “Central Station” argument…
[8.4.3.] Unger’s Argument: The Bugatti.
Following his Central Station argument, Peter Singer uses an argument put forward by another philosopher: Peter Unger.[4]
[See the story about Bob and his Bugatti: pp.61–62 of the Singer article.]
Singer notes the following differences between Bob (in the Bugatti story) and Dora (in the Central Station story):
1. Bob does not know the child, who is too far away from Bob for Bob to look into his or her face or for them to have a personal relationship.
2. Bob did not mislead the child or in any other way begin the chain of events leading to the child’s death.
So Bob’s choosing to save his car is much more like the decision of most Americans to spend money on themselves rather than to save the lives of young strangers far away.
Here is one way of putting the Bugatti Argument into standard form:
1. In the Bugatti story, Bob must (i) choose between keeping a lot of his wealth and sacrificing it to save the life of (ii) a child he does not know and (iii) whose life is in danger for reasons having nothing to do with Bob.
2. Many Americans and other relatively wealthy people are in the same situation: we can (i) choose to keep a lot of our wealth or to spend it to save (ii) children whom we don’t know and (iii) whose lives are in danger for reasons having nothing to do with us.
3. It would be (iv) immoral for Bob to let the child die.
4. Therefore, it would be (iv) immoral for us to let those children die.
To assess this argument, we need to ask: (a) are its premises true, and (b) is it logically strong (would the truth of its premises give us good reason to accept its conclusion)?
[8.4.4.] Objections and Replies.
Singer anticipates and responds to four possible objections to the Bugatti argument.
Objection #1: There is a relevant disanalogy between Bob’s situation and ours: Bob is certain that throwing the switch will save the child’s life, whereas we are uncertain how much of our donated money will actually go toward saving lives rather than to unnecessary expenses, padding the pockets of foreign dictators, etc.
Singer’s original response: Peter Unger (the utilitarian philosopher who originated the “Bob’s Bugatti” thought experiment) estimates that it costs $200 to finance the survival of an impoverished 2-year-old for four years, helping carry her through the most dangerous years of her young life. This estimate assumes that not all of the money will actually go toward aid and that some of it will go toward unnecessary expenses.
Singer’s more recent response: In his 2009 book The Life You Can Save, Singer advocates using the information provided by GiveWell. GiveWell researches many different charities and recommends those that it has found to be the most efficient at directing donated funds against the problems they try to alleviate.[5] As of this writing, one of GiveWell’s top recommended organizations is:
· Give Directly, which transfers cash to households in the developing world via a mobile phone-based payment service. It targets extremely low-income households and aims to deliver at least 90 cents directly to recipients for every $1.00 in total expenses.
Another possible response (not Singer’s): Suppose that when Bob throws the switch to divert the train, there is a 100% chance that his car will be destroyed, but only a 20% chance that the child’s life will be saved (because, say, debris will be thrown for hundreds of yards, endangering the child). Shouldn’t Bob still do whatever he can to try to save the child, even if his efforts might fail?
Now apply this reasoning to the case of world poverty... Suppose there is only a 20% chance your donation will actually go to helping a child (rather than padding the pockets of some dishonest bureaucrat or dictator). Shouldn’t you still take that chance rather than spending the money on something you yourself don’t need at all?
Objection #2: There will always be impoverished children whose lives can be saved with such donations. So if Singer’s view is correct, we will be obligated to continue giving any time that we have extra money, until we and the people we are trying to help are equally well-off. But this demand is too great—so Singer must be wrong.
Singer’s response: He accepts this consequence but denies that it is too much to accept. He defends his acceptance of it by asking: what additional sacrifices would we require from Bob in order to save the child’s life?
How far past losing the Bugatti should [Bob] go? Imagine that Bob had got his foot stuck in the track of the siding, and if diverted the train, then before it rammed the car it would also amputate his big toe. Should he still throw the switch? What if it would amputate his foot? His entire leg?
As absurd as the Bugatti scenario gets when pushed to extremes, the point it raises is a serious one: only when the sacrifices become very significant indeed would most people be prepared to say that Bob does nothing wrong when he decides not to throw the switch. Of course, most people could be wrong; we can’t decide moral issues by taking opinion polls. But consider for yourself the level of sacrifice that you would demand of Bob, and then think about how much money you would have to give away in order to make a sacrifice that is roughly equal to that. It’s almost certainly much, much more than $200. For most middle-class Americans, it could easily be more like $200,000. (pp.62–63)
Objection #3: It is unrealistic to demand so much from people. Even if Singer is right, his arguments are not going to convince most people to change their behavior and start donating. Most people in the developed world will simply shrug off his criticisms and keep living their lives as before.
Singer’s 1999 response: He does not expect the majority of people to begin donating all, or even most, of their extra income. “When it comes to praising or blaming people for what they do, we tend to use a standard that is relative to some conception of normal behavior” (p.63). So he will not “go out of his way to chastise” wealthy Americans who give away only 10% (for example) of their wealth. But that doesn’t mean that those wealthy Americans are not obligated to give more… and it doesn’t mean that ordinary, middle-class Americans are not obligated to give what they are able.
Singer’s later response: In The Life You Can Save, Singer offers an even lower, more practical standard: give just 1% of one’s net income.
Objection #4: There is another relevant difference between Bob and us: Bob is the only one who can save the child on the tracks, but there are millions of people besides us who could donate money to aid organizations.
Singer’s response: Most of those people aren’t donating anything, and the fact that there are millions who could donate but choose not to does not imply anything about whether you are obligated to donate. Suppose there are a number of different people along the tracks, each with his own Bugatti, and each decides to let the train kill the child. This does not imply that it is moral for you to make the same choice.
OPTIONAL VIDEO: Peter Singer’s TED Talk: “The Why and How of Effective Altruism” (17:19; 2013)
Information contained in these footnotes is provided in case you are interested in further reading. You will not be quizzed on the information given in these footnotes or on the websites to which they link. However, you should feel free to refer to this material in your discussion board posts.
[1] Nozick (1938-2002) was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University. His best known work, from which your reading assignment (“The Experience Machine”) is an excerpt, is Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
[2] For more information about Singer, see his web page. Wikipedia, which is not always very trustworthy, has a good article summarizing many of Singer’s ethical views.
[4] Peter Unger is a professor of philosophy at New York University.
[5] See Singer, The Life You Can Save, 2009, pp.84 ff.